Linux — Linux
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Input: zero ff_effect before compat copy in input_ff_effect_from_user In the compat path input_ff_effect_from_user() aliases the caller's native struct ff_effect with the smaller struct ff_effect_compat and copies only the compat sized prefix: compat_effect = (struct ff_effect_compat *)effect; if (copy_from_user(compat_effect, buffer, sizeof(struct ff_effect_compat))) The tail of the native structure is never written. Callers pass an uninitialized on-stack object, for example evdev_do_ioctl() for EVIOCSFF, so those bytes keep their previous stack contents. input_ff_upload() then stores the full native structure in ff->effects[id], from where a uinput based force feedback daemon can read it back via UI_BEGIN_FF_UPLOAD, disclosing kernel stack memory to userspace. Zero the effect before the compat copy.
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